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TAXATION: SUBSTANCE v. FORM AND OTHER ESOTERICA
JAY R. BESKIN*
DOUGLAS A. HANSON**
JOHN A. NELSON***
In the 1984-85 term,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit decided several significant tax cases. In doing so, the
circuit did not hesitate to march to the beat of a different drummer. This
article will discuss a taxpayer's inability to successfully argue the form of
a tax shelter over its substance;2 but a taxpayer's success in arguing sub-
stance over form with respect to investment tax credit;3 the tax
preparer's duty to inquire into taxpayer supplied information;4 the non-
deductibility of certain business meal expenses; 5 the new test with respect
to whether capital is a material income producing factor;6 the excludabil-
ity of certain bonds from estate taxation;7 the validity of the income fore-
cast method of depreciation for motion pictures;8 and the valuation of
players' contracts in sports franchises. 9
B.S., Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1975; C.P.A., 1977; J.D., Washington Uni-
versity, 1978; Associate at Schwartz & Freeman, Chicago, Illinois.
** B.S., Accountancy, University of Illinois-Urbana, 1983; C.P.A., 1983; Candidate for J.D.,
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1987.
*** B.A., History, Concordia College, 1975; J.D., Washington University, 1978; C.P.A., 1981;
L.L.M., Taxation, Georgetown University, 1983; Associate at Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons,
Dallas, Texas.
1. This article discusses tax cases decided by the Seventh Circuit between July 1, 1984 and
June 30, 1985.
2. Saviano v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 10 to 37 and
accompanying text.
3. Comdisco, Inc. v. United States, 756 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 38 to 66 and
accompanying text.
4. Brockhouse v. United States, 749 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1984). See infra notes 67 to 111 and
accompanying text.
5. Moss v. Commissioner, 758 F.2d 211 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 382 (1985). See
infra notes 112 to 134 and accompanying text.
6. Van Kalker v. Commissioner, 54 A.F.T.R.2d 5671 (P-H), 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9727
(CCH) (7th Cir. 1984). See infra notes 135 to 152 and accompanying text.
7. Haffner v. United States, 757 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 153 to 177 and
accompanying text.
8. Gordon v. Commissioner, 766 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 178 to 189 and
accompanying text.
9. Selig v. United States, 740 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1984). See infra notes 190 to 206 and accom-
panying text.
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COMMERCIAL SURREALISM
In Tufts v. Commissioner,'0 the Supreme Court held that on a tax-
payer's disposition of property encumbered by nonrecourse indebtedness
that exceeds the fair market value of the property, the amount which the
taxpayer realizes is equal to the unpaid balance of the debt. I The Court
predicated its holding on a tax benefit theory. 12 Unless the amount of the
mortgage is deemed to be realized, the taxpayer would have received un-
taxed income at the time the loan was extended, would have been entitled
to increase his basis in the property for depreciation purposes by the
amount of the indebtedness 13 and would avoid taxation upon extinguish-
ment of the obligation. The Court's analysis was based on two funda-
mental rules. First, loan proceeds do not qualify as income to a taxpayer
because he incurs an obligation to repay that loan at some date. If the
borrower is relieved of the liability to repay, the loan proceeds will be
includible in his income as if he received cash to satisfy the obligation.' 4
Second, the recovery within a taxable year of a previously deducted item
must be included in gross income to the extent that it produced a tax
benefit in a previous year.15 Deductions for depreciation provide shelter
from tax. A taxpayer's basis in his property is reduced by the amount of
such deductions, and the taxpayer must realize an increased gain or de-
creased loss on his disposition of the property. 16 For purposes of these
rules, the Tufts court thought it irrelevant that the amount of the nonre-
course loan exceeds the fair market value of the property. Although in
that situation, the taxpayer, against whom the lender has no personal
recourse, may have no economic motivation to continue mortgage pay-
ments, the Supreme Court assumed that the mortgage will be repaid in
full. 17
In Saviano v. Commissioner,18 the Seventh Circuit for the first time
confronted a taxpayer's argument that the Tufts decision mandates that a
nonrecourse loan secured by a percentage of the proceeds of a mining
venture be treated as a true loan even if there does not exist "a reasonable
likelihood that the loan will be repaid in light of all reasonably foresee-
10. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983).
11. 461 U.S. at 317-18.
12. Id. at 307-14.
13. Id. at 312-14.
14. Id. at 312-14; I.R.C. § 1001 (1985).
15. 461 U.S. at 308-10.
16. I.R.C. § 1014(b).
17. 461 U.S. 300.
18. 765 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1985).
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able risks."' 19 The taxpayer's argument supposed that the Tufts holding
applies to all nonrecourse loans and mandates a tax benefit analysis. The
Seventh Circuit, presented with the issue of whether an expense is de-
ductible when paid with the proceeds of a nonrecourse loan which may
not be repaid, refused to apply the Tufts analysis. Rather, it used an
economic analysis in order to rule that the essence of the relationship
between the taxpayer and the lender was that of co-venturers and, ac-
cordingly, that the loan proceeds were in the nature of an equity invest-
ment by the lender. Thus, expenses paid with the loan proceeds were not
deductible by the borrower as a mining expense. 20
The Saviano case concerned two separate tax shelters promoted by
International Monetary Exchange (IME) in 1978 and 1979. The case
was before the court on appeal from the Tax Court's partial summary
judgment in favor of the IRS, and the court assumed that the various
steps of the transaction were consummated in the manner set forth in the
offering materials. 2' In the 1978 transaction, IME obstensibly obtained
for Saviano a mineral lease on certain gold-bearing land in Panama
which Saviano would develop. Saviano would thereby obtain deductions
for mining development expenses under I.R.C. § 616(a). 22 In order to
obtain a deduction of $40,000 in 1978, Saviano deposited $10,000 with
IME.23 He also entered into a "Loan Agreement" with IME under
which he purportedly borrowed $30,000 from IME under a nonrecourse
obligation bearing interest at 10% and which would be payable and se-
cured solely by the proceeds resulting from the mineral claim or any
minerals extracted therefrom.24 Any interest on the note unpaid when
due was to be treated as a new advance under the loan agreement. In
addition to interest, IME was also entitled to a commission of two per-
cent of the net amount of any sales made from the claim. Under the
terms of the Loan Agreement, IME's only self-help was a provision that,
if the full advances under the loan equalled the estimated market value of
the gold, IME could extract and liquidate sufficient gold to reduce the
19. Gibson Prod. Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1981).
20. 765 F.2d at 650.
21. Id. at 645.
22. Under the at-risk rules of I.R.C. § 465 added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 the amount of
taxable losses incurred in business or investment ventures cannot exceed the amount of taxpayer's
economic commitment to the business or venture. In 1978, those provisions were extended to I.R.C.
§ 616(a) mining expenses to disallow such deductions to the extent the mining activities were fi-
nanced through nonrecourse indebtedness as opposed to the taxpayer's actual cash outlay. The
adoption of the 1978 amendment to I.R.C. § 465 forced the IME to restructure its tax structure
program for the 1979 taxable year.
23. 765 F.2d at 645.
24. Id. at 646.
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indebtedness to an amount equivalent to 75% of the estimated market
value.25 Saviano was not required to pay anything to obtain the lease. 26
Although the lessor was entitled to fifty percent of the extracted gold,
after deductions for certain expenses, the loan did not require Saviano to
ever extract gold. 27 The lease would terminate on the earlier of April,
1990 or Saviano's abandonment of the mining operation.
The Tax Court28 held for the Internal Revenue Service on the
ground that an expense is deductible by a cash basis taxpayer only in the
year in which payment is made29 or in which the taxpayer incurs a defi-
nite obligation to make payment.30 That is the time when the taxpayer
suffers an economic detriment. Since the obligation to IME was contin-
gent upon the sale of gold, Saviano would not suffer an economic detri-
ment until the loan is actually paid, if ever.3'
In the 1979 tax shelter scheme, the taxpayer deposited $8,000 with
IME.32 The taxpayer received a mineral claim. He then sold IME an
option to purchase gold extracted from the claim for $32,000. 33 IME,
acting as the taxpayer's agent, paid $40,000 to prepare the claim for the
extraction of gold.34 The taxpayer claimed the entire amount of this pay-
ment as a deduction on his 1979 tax return. The Service asserted that the
taxpayer's deduction should be denied to the extent of the $32,000 ob-
tained from IME from the sale of the option and also that the option
proceeds should be taxed as income to the taxpayer in 1979. The Tax
Court, in granting the Service a partial summary judgment, ruled that
the $32,000 payment to the taxpayer was includible in the taxpayer's in-
come for 1979, on the theory that the option was not a true option but
rather a right of first refusal. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
decision of the Tax Court.
The taxpayer, in his arguments to the Seventh Circuit, attempted to
characterize the sale of his option as an "open transaction. ' 35 The Sev-
enth Circuit deftly swept this argument aside concluding that since the
taxpayer had no basis in the mineral claims, none of the money received
from IME could be classified as a return of capital. Furthermore, since
25. Id.
26. Id. at 645.
27. Id.
28. 80 T.C. 955 (1983).
29. Id. at 965.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 765 F.2d at 651.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 652.
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the gain recognizable as a consequence of the sale of the option was ordi-
nary income, there was no rationale for applying the "open transaction"
rule to defer the recognition of income from the transaction to a subse-
quent tax year.
The Seventh Circuit, in Saviano, effectively applies an economic
analysis approach to the evaluation of the tax effect of a nonrecourse
loan. The decision demonstrates that the economic analysis and the tax
benefit analysis are not mutually exclusive.36 Courts can pick and choose
the theory best suited to the circumstances to strike at abusive tax shel-
ters. 37 Saviano reflects the inclination of the court to examine the sub-
stance of a tax shelter scheme and disregard, when appropriate, the form
in which such transaction is cast by the taxpayer.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT: SUBSTANCE OVER FORM
In Comdisco, Inc. v. United States,38 the Seventh Circuit held that a
taxpayer could disavow the form of a transaction and argue its substance
if there is no possibility of a conflicting claim to the tax benefit. Specifi-
cally, Comdisco leased property from a lessor. The lessor had an existing
lease on the property with another lessee. The lessor assigned its rights
in the latter lease to Comdisco. Thus, in effect, Comdisco became a
lessee-sublessor. Such a relationship made Comdisco eligible for the in-
vestment tax credit 39 (hereinafter ITC) under I.R.C. § 48(d)(1) 40, treat-
36. Indeed in Footnote 5 in Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307-08, the Supreme Court indicates that the
Commissioner might have argued that a nonrecourse mortgage is not a true debt, but is a joint
investment between a mortgagor and mortgagee.
37. The Seventh Circuit had no doubt that IME has packaged an abusive shelter. They freely
noted "that only a fool would actually believe that the transactions did in fact occur as described.
The many elements of commercial surrealism present in these tax shelters should have put a reason-
able person on notice that he was not being shown all the cards in the deck." 765 F.2d at 654.
38. 756 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1985).
39. I.R.C. § 38(a) (1985) provides:
(a) Allowance ofcredit.-There shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by
this chapter for the taxable year an amount equal to the sum of-(l) the business credit
carryforwards carried to such taxable year, (2) the amount of the current year business
credit, plus (3) the business credit carrybacks carried to such taxable year.
Id. The business credit includes the 10% regular percentage investment tax credit. I.R.C.
§§ 38(b)(1), 46(a)-(b).
40. I.R.C. § 48(d) (1985) provides in part as follows:
(d) Certain leased property.-() General Rule.-A person (other than a person referred
to in section 46(d)(1)) who is a lessor of property may (at such time, in such manner, and
subject to such conditions are as provided by regulations prescribed by the Secretary) elect
with respect to any new section 38 property (other than property described in paragraph
(4)) to treat the lessee as having acquired such property .... (3) Limitations.-The elec-
tions provided by paragraphs (1) and (2) may be made with respect to property which
would be new section 38 property if acquired by the lessee ....
Id. at (1), (3).
Treas. Reg. § 1.48-4(a)(1)(iii) (1984) provides that the lessee be the "original user" to qualify for
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ing Comdisco as having acquired the property as lessee. The court
concluded that section 48(d)(1) entitled Comdisco to the ITC and re-
versed the district court's decision.41
Comdisco arranged leases on new and used computer equipment.
In 1974, Comdisco arranged the following transactions with Decimus 42
and a third party: (1) Decimus leased computer equipment to a third
party,43 (2) Decimus assigned to Comdisco all rights and duties under
the Decimus/third party lease, (3) Decimus leased the same equipment
[from (1)] to Comdisco. 44 Comdisco and Decimus structured the trans-
action in this manner so that Decimus could comply with Regulation Y
pertaining to banks and bank holding companies. 45 Decimus, as a sub-
sidiary of a bank holding company, was subject to Regulation Y's provi-
sions regarding rate of return on personal property leases. A direct lease
to the third party would not have had the requisite return.46 Because the
Decimus/Comdisco lease contained a longer leasehold than the
Decimus/third party lease, the former fell within Regulation y.47 After
the lease with the third party expired, the equipment reverted back to
Comdisco. Comdisco, however, never entered into a formal sublease.
with the third party. If Comdisco was in form and substance a lessee-
sublessor, the ITC would be undisputedly available. 48 As a lessee in the
Decimus/Comdisco lease, and in effect a sublessor to the third party,
Comdisco claimed the ITC.49
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit first concluded that Comdisco in
the credit. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.48-2(b)(7) (1984) (a use by the lessor or some other person not
for the property's intended function is not an original use and, thus, does not preclude ITC).
41. 756 F.2d at 579.
42. Id. at 573. Decimus Computer Leasing Corporation also arranged leases. Decimus, as a
subsidiary of a bank holding company, was subject to Regulation Y (see infra notes 45-47 and ac-
companying text). Decimus and Comdisco entered into three similar series of transactions. Id. at
573-74. For simplicity, only one series will be discussed.
43. The Decimus/third party lease provided for rental at $73,381 per month for forty-eight
months, with Decimus retaining the ITC and retaining the "right to assign the leases 'to a third
party, said third party [Comdisco] to become Lessor's primary lessee for the equipment under an-
other lease.' " 756 F.2d at 573.
44. The Decimus/Comdisco lease provided for rental at $73,381 per month for sixty months,
authorized Comdisco to sublease the equipment to the third party, and transferred the ITC to Com-
disco. Id. at 573-74.
45. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(5) (1985).
46. 756 F.2d at 573-74. Regulation Y requires a certain return on leased property by bank
holding company subsidiaries. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(5)(iv) (1985) provides that the lease "will yield
a return that will compensate the lessor for not less than the lessor's full investment in the property
plus the estimated total cost of financing the property over the term of the lease .... "
47. The "cost of financing" factors include the term of the lease. 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(5)(iv)
at n.5. In the series of transactions not discussed, the Decimus/Comdisco lease provided for a
higher rent instead of a longer term. 756 F.2d at 574.
48. 756 F.2d at 577.
49. Id. at 574.
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economic reality created a lease-sublease.5 0 The Government argued
that the Decimus/Comdisco lease was a sham because the third party
made the lease payments directly to Decimus and Comdisco never pos-
sessed the equipment. The court rejected these arguments on the basis
that the third party's direct rental payments and Decimus' direct delivery
to the third party were necessitated by "transactional efficiencies" and
"business realities." 51 Indeed, Comdisco was a lessee-sublessor. After
the expiration of the lease with the third party, the equipment reverted to
Comdisco.5 2 In addition, the court noted that if Comdisco was not, in
reality, a lessee-sublessor in the transaction, the Decimus/third party
lease would be unenforceable as contradictory to Federal Regulation y.53
After noting the economic reality of the lease-sublease, the court
concluded that Congressional purpose would be served by allowing Com-
disco to take the ITC. 54 Congress intended that the credit be liberally
construed so as to stimulate the country's economic growth. 55 Without
Comdisco, Decimus could never have entered into the transaction.
Thus, Comdisco was the party "actually generating the demand for the
investment" and was, therefore, entitled to the credit.5 6
Generally, although the Internal Revenue Service may attack the
substance over the form of a transaction, 57 a taxpayer may not disavow
the form chosen for the transaction. 58 Thus, the rule would preclude
Comdisco from arguing a lessee-sublessor relationship when the form of
the transaction created a lessee-lessor's assignee status. 59 However, the
rule, the court noted, created an unfair relationship between the taxpayer
and the IRS.6° In order to alleviate this unfair treatment, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the general rule need only apply in cases which
50. Id. at 577.
51. Id. at 576.
52. Id. Moreover, in the other series of transactions, Comdisco paid Decimus monthly for
incremental rent for the difference between the Decimus/Comdisco lease and the Decimus/third
party lease.
53. Id. at 576-77. Here, the court noted that experienced business people would not have en-
tered into an unenforceable contract. Thus, the parties intended a lessee-sublessor relationship.
54. Id. at 577.
55. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
56. H. R. REP. No. 1477, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
57. See, e.g., Sullivan v. United States, 618 F.2d 1001, 1007 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that the
Commissioner may attack substance over form).
58. See, e.g., Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating, 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974) ("This
Court has observed repeatedly that, while a taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he chooses,
nevertheless once having done so, he must accept the tax consequences of his choice..
59. 756 F.2d at 577.
60. Id. at 577-78. Furthermore, the court noted that the Fifth Circuit disagreed in Spector v.
Commissioner, 641 F.2d 376, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 868 (1981) ("The parties are free
to make their own agreement. The Commissioner, on the other hand, has to deal with the apparent
agreement he is faced with. It does not seem unfair that he should be less strictly bound to its bona
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two parties in a transaction could each claim a tax benefit to which only
one party is entitled. One party argues form; the other argues substance.
Although only one party is entitled to the benefit, the IRS would have to
proceed against both.6' In the ITC leasing context, however, either the
lessor takes the credit or, upon an I.R.C. § 48(d)(1) express election, the
lessee takes it.62 Thus, because there was no possibility of conflicting
claims the court concluded that Comdisco was entitled to the ITC.63
The Comdisco case impacts on the ability of a taxpayer to disavow
form and argue substance to the IRS. The taxpayer, however, must meet
two criteria: (1) there must be no other party who could possibly use the
form to argue a conflicting tax benefit, 64 and (2) the taxpayer must con-
sistently characterize the transaction by its substance. 65 In the ITC con-
text, the former criterion will always be met-only one party could take
the credit. The credit can be transferred only by express election. The
court, however, did not address the question of whether the taxpayer
may argue substance if all possible conflicting claimants waive the right
to the beneficial tax treatment. Arguably, the Seventh Circuit will allow
a taxpayer to argue substance over form, after such a waiver, because
there would be no possibility that the IRS would have to proceed against
more than one taxpayer. After a waiver is obtained, there would be no
purpose in applying the general rule.66
TAX RETURN PREPARER'S DUTY TO INQUIRE
In Brockhouse v. United States,67 a case of first impression, the Sev-
fides than are the parties themselves..." quoting Harvey Radio Laboratories, Inc. v. Commissioner,
470 F.2d 118, 120 (lst Cir. 1972)).
61. Id. at 577-78. Thus, the IRS would have to take action against both parties to determine
which one should get the beneficial tax treatment. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d
771 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 858 (1967).
62. See supra note 40.
63. In this regard the court used broad language. "We see no reason to extend the Govern-
ment's power to hold a taxpayer to the technical form of its transactions to situations in which the
Government will never face conflicting claims." 756 F.2d at 578. The court adopts the rule in
Weinert's Estate v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961) ("The taxpayer too has a right to
assert the priority of substance-at least in a case where his tax reporting and action show an honest
and consistent respect for the substance of the transaction." 294 F.2d at 755). 756 F.2d at 578.
Comdisco had acted as if it was a lessee-sublessor during the transactions. Additionally, the court
summarily dismissed the "original user" argument noting that because Comdisco was the lessee, it
also was the "original user" (see supra note 40). See, e.g., Illinois Valley Paving Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 687 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding that a leasing is an original use). 756
F.2d at 579.
64. See supra note 63.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 749 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1984).
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enth Circuit held that a tax return preparer68 is liable under Internal
Revenue Code section 6694(a) 69 for failing to inquire into the sufficiency
and credibility of taxpayer-supplied information when such failure re-
sults in filing a return that violates a rule or regulation. 70 This holding
creates a duty on tax return preparers to inquire into unverified informa-
tion supplied by taxpayers.
In 1976, Congress enacted section 6694(a)71 providing for preparer
penalties upon any "negligent or intentional disregard of rules and regu-
lations."' 72 Treasury Regulations promulgated under that section pro-
vide that a preparer will not be liable if the preparer "exercises due
diligence" in applying the rules and regulations. 73 However, the Treas-
ury did not address the question whether a preparer may rely on unveri-
fied information supplied by the taxpayer.74
The Internal Revenue Service attempted to answer this question in
Revenue Procedure 80-4075 which sets forth guidelines in applying the
statute. In applying section 6694(a), the Service will look at the facts and
circumstances of the particular case, including the: (1) Nature of the
Error-was the error the result of a complex or uncommon rule which a
competent preparer may have missed?; (2) Frequency of Errors-was the
error isolated or repeated, was it obvious, or was it flagrant?; and (3) Ma-
teriality of Error-was the error immaterial in relation to the taxpayer's
68. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36) (1985) (defining a tax return preparer as any person or employer of
such a person who prepares returns for compensation).
69. I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1985) which provides:
Negligent or intentional disregard of rules or regulations.-If any part of any understate-
ment of liability with respect to any return or claim for refund is due to the negligent or
intentional disregard of rules and regulations by any person who is an income tax return
preparer with respect to such return or claim, such person shall pay a penalty of $100 with
respect to such return or claim.
70. 749 F.2d at 1251.
71. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, Title XII, § 1203(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1689 (1976).
72. I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1985).
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(a)(1) (1985). In addition, the preparer has the burden of proof to
show that he did not negligently or intentionally disregard a rule or regulation. Id. at q (5). The
regulation also provides support for the preparer if the preparer reasonably and in good faith believes
that a rule or regulation does not reflect the code. Id. at (4).
74. Impliedly, the Treasury did not address the question because it included the following state-
ment in subsection (b):
Willful understatement of liability: Generally, in preparing a return, the preparer may in
good faith rely without verification upon information furnished by the taxpayer. To avoid
the penalty, the preparer is not required to examine or review documents or other evidence
in order to verify independently the taxpayer's information. However, the preparer may
not ignore the implications of information furnished. The preparer shall make reasonable
inquiries if the information as furnished appears to be incorrect or incomplete.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(b)(2)(ii) (such statement was omitted from subsection (a)).
75. Rev. Proc. 80-40, 1980-2 C.B. 774. This Revenue Procedure applies only to the negligent
disregard portion of § 6694(a). Id. at 775.
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total liability?76 If, after consideration of these factors, the Service con-
cludes that the return was negligently prepared, it will not assess the
section 6694(a) penalty if the preparer has a normal office procedure
which would ensure that the error would rarely occur and that this office
procedure was indeed followed.77 Thus, the Service will allow the
preparer to rely on taxpayer-furnished information and will not require
the preparer to audit or examine the taxpayer's records. But, if the infor-
mation appears incorrect or incomplete, the preparer must make reason-
able inquiries as to the discrepancies or lack of information. 78
In Revenue Ruling 80-265, 79 the Service also attempted to answer
the question of whether a preparer may rely on unverified taxpayer-sup-
plied information. The Ruling posed two hypothetical fact situations. In
Situation 1, the preparer received personal information concerning the
taxpayer in addition to information regarding the taxpayer's wholly-
owned corporation. None of the information disclosed that the taxpayer
had made any loans to the business. In Situation 2, the information re-
garding the business showed that the business made interest payments to
the taxpayer. In both cases, the preparer failed to include the interest
income received from the business on the taxpayer's personal return.
The Service held that the penalty should not be assessed in Situation 1
because the preparer had no reason to believe that the furnished informa-
tion was incomplete. Conversely, in Situation 2, the penalty should be
assessed because the preparer should have inquired in order to reconcile
the discrepancies between the business and personal records. 80 The fact
situation in Brockhouse falls between these two situations.
In Brockhouse, the appellant preparer, a certified public accountant,
was assessed the section 6694(a) penalty for negligent disregard of the
rules and regulations when he failed to include interest income on the
taxpayer's 1978 personal return. Brockhouse prepared the taxpayer's
personal return and the corporate return for the taxpayer's wholly-
owned medical practice.81 In connection with the preparation, and pur-
suant to normal office procedure, Brockhouse sent the taxpayer a data
questionnaire. The taxpayer, however, did not fill out the questionnaire,
but directed the corporation's bookkeeper to send both the personal and
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The reasonable inquiry language closely parallels the language in Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-
l(b)(2)(ii) relating to willful understatement. See supra note 74. Thus, the Service favors a broad
interpretation of § 6694(a).
79. Rev. Rul. 80-265, 1980-2 C.B. 378.
80. Id.
81. 749 F.2d at 1250.
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corporate returns to Brockhouse.8 2 Brockhouse used this information to
prepare the returns after noting no unusual discrepancies or missing
items from the prior year's returns.
The information furnished by the bookkeeper showed that the tax-
payer had loaned money to the business, but that he had not received
interest on the loan. The corporate information revealed, however, that
the corporation paid interest, although the payee was not disclosed. The
information also showed that the corporation had bank loans outstand-
ing.8 3 Brockhouse never inquired whether any of the interest paid was
paid to the taxpayer. 84
Subsequent to the 1978 filings, the Internal Revenue Service audited
the corporate return. During the audit the Service learned of the corpo-
ration's interest payment to the taxpayer 85 and assessed a section 6694(a)
penalty against him. Brockhouse paid 15% of the penalty8 6 and filed suit
for a refund. The district court denied the refund. 87
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court, holding
that the section 6694(a) penalty applies when a "negligent failure to in-
quire into information provided by the taxpayer results in the filing of a
return that violates a rule or regulation. ' 88 The Seventh Circuit further
held that a negligent failure to inquire occurs when "the information sup-
plied would lead a reasonable, prudent preparer to seek additional infor-
mation" and the preparer does not seek such information. 89 The court
concluded that, in this case, a reasonable, prudent preparer would have
inquired further.
In its opinion, the court examined the Congressional purpose behind
section 6694. Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
preparers were subject only to criminal fraud penalties. Because these
penalties were inadequate to deter abusive practices by preparers, Con-
gress created the section 6694 sanctions.90 In early hearings on the bill,
the sanctions were to apply only against "commercial" preparers. 91
82. Id.
83. Brockhouse v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 55, 56 (1983).
84. 749 F.2d at 1250.
85. Id.
86. See I.R.C. § 6694(c) (1985).
87. 577 F. Supp. 55.
88. 749 F.2d at 1251.
89. Id. at 1252.
90. Id. at 1251. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 273-75 (1975); S. REP. No. 938,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 349-51 (1976).
91. 799 F.2d at 1251. Congress defined "commercial" preparers as "individuals often without
formal training engaged in the seasonal business of preparing tax returns." H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 274 (1975).
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However, Congress decided that, with the enormous increase in profes-
sional and commercial return preparation in the years prior to 1976, the
sanctions should apply against all negligent preparers as a means of regu-
lation. 92 Applying the penalty to such a failure to inquire appears to fall
within Congressional intent.
The court relied upon legislative history, Treasury Regulations, and
IRS Rulings in creating the reasonable, prudent preparer standard of
care. Congress intended that the section 6694(a) penalties should be in-
terpreted in a manner similar to the taxpayer penalties in I.R.C.
§ 6653(a). 93 The "reasonable person under the circumstances" stan-
dard-"what a reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under
the circumstances"-used in the taxpayer penalty setting was, therefore,
applicable to tax preparer penalties. 94 Moreover, the Treasury Regula-
tions require due diligence, 95 similar to the reasonable preparer's re-
sponse, and impliedly require an inquiry into taxpayer-supplied
information. 96 Finally, the court noted that the Service creates a duty to
inquire when there is reason to believe that the information furnished is
incomplete. 97 Thus, Congress, the Treasury, and the Service appear to
support the court's standard of care.
The court then determined that Brockhouse had not met this duty.
Because Brockhouse knew that there were loans from the taxpayer to his
business and that the business paid interest, the fact that interest might
have been paid to the taxpayer was relatively apparent. Interest bearing
loans in this situation are not uncommon.98 The error could have been
discovered with minimal effort. Therefore, the court concluded that the
reasonable, prudent preparer would have inquired into whether the tax-
payer received any interest.
Judge Campbell submitted a long and vehement dissent. 99 He ar-
92. 749 F.2d at 1251. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1975); S. REP. No.
938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 351 (1976). Arguably, by regulating all preparers, Congress intended to
curb all preparer practices which result in less tax revenues. This is a departure from the "abusive"
practices by "commercial" preparers originally targeted by Congress. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1975) (In these "abusive" situations the preparer, after promising a certain
minimum refund, would require the taxpayer to sign the return in blank and then claim fictitious
deductions or excess exemptions).
93. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 278 (1975).
94. See Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044
(1968). The Fifth Circuit applied the "lack of due care or failure to do what a reasonable and
ordinarily prudent person would do under the circumstances" standard. 380 F.2d at 506.
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(a)(1) (1985).
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(b)(2)(ii) (1985). Cf. supra note 74.
97. Rev. Rul. 80-265, 1980-2 C.B. 378.
98. 749 F.2d 1252; cf. 749 F.2d 1253 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (a noninterest bearing loan is
the common scenario).
99. 749 F.2d at 1253-56 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
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gued that, as a penal statute, section 6694(a) should be strictly construed.
Thus, because the Internal Revenue Code expressly bans "negligent...
disregard of rules and regulations," the penalty should be applied only
when there is a misapplication of the rules or regulations.' °° He would
not have assessed a penalty because there was no such misapplication.
Brockhouse reasonably relied on information provided by the taxpayer's
experienced bookkeeper and this information fit the common practice of
a taxpayer making a noninterest bearing loan to his solely-owned
business. 101
The Seventh Circuit's liberal reading of I.R.C. § 6694(a) in
Brockhouse imposes a duty on a tax return preparer to inquire into un-
verified information supplied by a taxpayer. A breach of the duty and
resultant exposure to the penalty occurs when the information supplied
would lead a reasonable, prudent preparer to inquire further. The Sev-
enth Circuit limited this duty to situations where "it is simple to collect
the necessary additional information."' 0 2 This duty to inquire is consis-
tent with the trend requiring tax practitioners to further inquire in other
contexts, as when rendering tax shelter opinions. 10 3
This limited duty to inquire is consistent with the logical notion that
a tax return preparer can never know, in fact, whether the information
supplied is false or incomplete. Indeed, because the IRS has the burden
of enforcing the various tax laws, the preparer need only comply with the
tax laws after satisfying himself of the completeness and truthfulness of
the taxpayer's data.
The tax return preparer may avoid exposure to the section 6694(a)
penalty by performing some "simple" steps which would normally lead
to the disclosure of false facts and incomplete information.1°4  The
preparer should create standard office procedures for further inquiry,
such as nontechnical client questionnaires.105 The questionnaires should
require the taxpayer's signature as a representation that all information
100. I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1985).
101. 749 F.2d at 1255.
102. Id. at 1252.
103. See, e.g., Treasury Circular 230, 49 Fed. Reg. 6722 (1984) (requiring the tax practitioner to
make a full due diligence inquiry into the facts upon which an advisory tax shelter opinion is based).
For an extensive explanation of tax practitioners' duties in tax shelter offerings see Falik, Standards
for Professionals Providing Tax Opinions in Tax Shelter Offerings, 37 TAX LAWYER 4 at 701-17
(1984).
104. Such procedures are consistent with the Service's stance not to assess the penalty in limited
circumstances. See Rev. Proc. 80-40, 1980-2 C.B. 774; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 357
(1975). See also supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
105. To preclude the taxpayer from applying tax laws to his transactions, questions similar to
the following are appropriate: (1) Did you receive any cash or property which was not in a gift or
inheritance context and not inform us as to its nature and amount? or (2) For all expenses which you
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supplied is complete and truthful. If the taxpayer refuses to sign or re-
turn the questionnaire, this may be indicative of an inpropriety in sup-
plied information. In this instance, the preparer has two options:
(1) withdraw from the engagement, thus risking no exposure (but losing
the fees); or (2) risk some exposure while protecting one's self by per-
forming the fluctuation tests described below.'0 6
In addition to the questionnaire, the preparer should also determine
whether the current year's information fluctuates significantly with the
prior year. If a significant fluctuation discrepancy is noted, the preparer
should obtain and document an explanation from the taxpayer. If the
explanation appears reasonable, the preparer's duty is met. If not, the
preparer should examine client records. The preparer, however, is under
no duty to audit the information; 10 7 he is only under a duty to perform
the simple steps necessary to acquire the additional information includ-
ing a reasonable attempt to obtain the prior year's return.10 8 If, for ex-
ample, the current year's charitable contributions doubled or tripled the
prior year's contributions, or the current year's contributions in relation
to current gross income is double such relationship from the prior year,
the preparer should seek and document any and all taxpayer
explanations.
One could take the position that the Seventh Circuit's liberal read-
ing of section 6694(a) was unintended by Congress. Through enforce-
ment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 Congress intended to curb
"abusive" practices by tax return preparers.10 9 As an example of an in-
tentional disregard of a rule and regulation, Congress cited the instance
of a preparer deducting all of the taxpayer's medical expenses without
first subtracting the applicable percentage of adjusted gross income. 10
This example connotes a misapplication of a specific tax rule and does
not imply that a preparer should be penalized for relying on unverified
taxpayer supplied information. The interpretation in Brockhouse, how-
ever, should increase compliance with the tax laws by placing a greater
burden on preparers. In addition, the Brockhouse majority, by qualifying
the duty to cases where "it is simple to collect the necessary additional
classify as "business travel" do you have receipts and a ledger proving the amounts and nature of the
transactions?
106. For a discussion of office procedures to reduce preparer exposure see Brockhouse, Steps that
Accountants Can Take Now to Reduce Exposure to the Return Preparer Penalties, 26 TAXATION FOR
ACcOUNTANTs 141 (1981). Ironically, this article was written by the preparer in the Brockhouse
case.
107. Rev. Proc. 80-40, 1980-2 C.B. 774-75.
108. 749 F.2d at 1252.
109. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 274-75 (1975).
110. Id. at 279.
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information," has created a duty which is relatively inexpensive to meet,
further helping toward increased compliance.III
DEATH OF A PARTNER'S LUNCH EXPENSE
In Moss v. Commissioner,'12 the Seventh Circuit confronted the issue
of whether a partner in an eight-member law firm could deduct his share
of daily partner lunch expenses as ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses.1 13 The court concluded that, although the lunch expenses were
ordinary, they were not necessary business expenses.11 4 These costs con-
stituted nondeductible personal expenses.
Appellant Moss was a partner in a small litigation firm. The firm
had a huge daily caseload. Due to the caseload, the only reasonably con-
venient time for daily firm meetings at which members discussed cases
and partners approved settlements was during lunch when the courts
were closed. 115 Consequently, the firm met daily at a nearby, reasonably
priced restaurant. Moss deducted his share of partner lunch expenses,
approximately four dollars per day, on his annual return. 1 16 The Internal
Revenue Service disallowed the deductions. The Tax Court ruled in
favor of the Service, 1 7 and Moss appealed the decision.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision. The court
first discussed Internal Revenue Code sections 162(a) and 262.111 The
court observed that the problem in applying these sections was that meal
expenses are simultaneously personal and business expenses." 9 Thus, a
"windfall" is created when a businessperson deducts his portion of a
111. 749 F.2d at 1252.
112. 758 F.2d 211 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 382 (1985).
113. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1985) providing: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business
114. 758 F.2d at 213-14.
115. Id. at 212.
116. SeeId. at211.
117. Moss v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1073 (1983), affd, 758 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 382 (1985).
118. 758 F.2d at 212. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (supra note 113). I.R.C. § 262 (1985) provides: "Ex-
cept as otherwise provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or
family expenses." See also Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5) (1984) ("Except as permitted under section
162 ... the costs of the taxpayer's meals not incurred in travelling away from home are personal
expenses").
The court noted that because Moss was a partner and not an employee, I.R.C. § 119 did not
apply. 758 F.2d at 212. (I.R.C. § 119 excludes from an employee's income the value of employer
provided meals when the meals are provided for the employer's convenience on the employer's
premises). In addition, the court noted that I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) did not apply because Moss was not
in a "travel" status. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) allows a deduction for all ordinary and necessary business
expenses incurred while travelling away from home, including meal expenses.
119. 758 F.2d at 212.
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business meal. 120  The windfall is allowed in some circumstances to
lighten the burden on individuals who spend more on a meal precisely
because it is a business meal. Although the person might enjoy the meal,
this deduction is allowed because his utility derived therefrom is less than
his utility from the cash equivalent. This utility discrepancy is incurred
by the individual because the meal may lead to a business benefit. '21 This
analysis spawned the Sutter Rule 122 which is limited by current I.R.C.
§ 162(a)(2)123 providing a deduction for the full cost of the meal when a
utility discrepancy is proven.
Since, by its nature, the business meal is inherently personal, the
taxpayer must prove a "real business necessity" for the meal.' 24 In this
regard, the court noted three significant factors: facilitation, utility dis-
crepancy, and frequency. A business meal will be deductible when it is
needed to facilitate a business discussion. The meal reduces the transac-
tion costs in business by reducing business frictions. Taking a customer
out to lunch to a more comfortable setting, for example, may ease the
business discussion and quicken contract negotiations. 25 Because the
cost of this type of business meal is related to income, it satisfies the
business necessity requirement.
The higher the frequency of the meals, the lower their business ne-
cessity. The more often a business person and his customers eat together,
the less the meal is needed for facilitating the meeting. In discussing this
test, the court emphasized the frequency factor over the facilitation fac-
tor although, arguably, frequency has no relation to any income derived
120. Id.
121. Id. at 213. ("[the taxpayer] would not pay for it if it were not for the business benefit; he
would get more value from using the same money to buy something else; hence the meal confers on
him less utility than the cash equivalent would").
122. The Sutter Rule was enunciated in Sutter v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 170 (1953):
The cost of meals, entertainment, and similar items for one's self.., is ordinarily and by its
very nature personal expenses forbidden deduction by section [262]. The presumption, no
doubt rebuttable, must accordingly arise that such costs are nondeductible.... [W]e think
the presumptive nondeductibility of personal expenses may be overcome only by clear and
detailed evidence as to each instance that the expenditure in question was different from or
in excess of that which would have been made for the taxpayer's personal purposes.
Id. at 173.
For a discussion of the Sutter Rule, including the applicability of the Tax Court's decision in the
principal case see McNally, Vulnerability of Entertainment and Meal Deductions Under the Sutter
Rule, 62 TAXES 184 (1984).
123. As the Court discussed in United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 301 n.6 (1967), the Treas-
ury Department, because of administrative problems, requested that the deduction for meals be al-
lowed in full-not merely the excess over a normal meal. This request was codified in I.R.C.
§ 162(a)(2) (creating a deduction for the full amount of the meal).
124. 758 F.2d at 213.
125. Id.
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from the meeting.' 26
The court also discussed the utility discrepancy. A utility discrep-
ancy exists when the value of the meal to the businessperson, as a meal, is
less than its cost. The court reasoned that a meal in a disagreeable res-
taurant or in an expensive restaurant would create such a discrepancy.127
In applying these tests to Moss's situation, the court concluded that
the meals were not needed to facilitate business, the meals were too fre-
quent, and the meals created no utility discrepancy. The meals were not
needed to facilitate the members of Moss's law firm because the firm had
no more than eight lawyer/co-workers. Presumably, these members
worked well together. Moreover, the fact that the firm held these
lunches daily indicated the lack of business necessity for the meal. Addi-
tionally, Moss ate at a reasonably priced, agreeable restaurant. The
lunch costs were approximately four dollars per day. This is about the
same cost as Moss would have incurred personally. Thus, no utility dis-
crepancy was created by these meals. The court concluded that,
although the firm necessarily had to meet during the lunch hour to dis-
cuss firm business, the firm did not have to incur a deductible meal ex-
pense at this time. 128
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Moss impacts on those other busi-
ness expenses which are also inherently personal.1 29 Now, in order to
deduct inherently personal business expenses, the taxpayer must show
that the expense was needed to facilitate a business transaction, that the
frequency of such expenses was not too high, and that the expense cre-
ated a utility discrepancy in the businessperson. Moreover, the decision
is not limited to law firms. The decision applies to all inherently personal
business expenses regardless of the type of entity or type of business
involved.
The Moss decision substantially relies on the frequency argument.
The court blindly endorses the disallowance of lunch expenses with cli-
ents and customers when they are incurred on a daily basis: "[d]aily-
126. Id. Here the Seventh Circuit apparently endorses Hankenson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1567 (1984). In Hankenson, the Tax Court disallowed the daily deduction of lunches with
clients because of the frequency of such expenses. Arguably, however, this decision may be limited
to situations which the persons (these were fellow referring physicians working in the same hospital)
taken out were part of a small group of clients each having many meals with the taxpayer. The
expenses were not needed to facilitate any business transaction between the taxpayer and this small
group of clients.
127. 758 F.2d at 213-14.
128. Id.
129. Examples of inherently personal expenses (where § 162(a) is overlapped by § 262) are:
meals (while not in the "travel" status), entertainment, and other fringe benefits which confer a
personal benefit and which are not related to income.
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for a full year-is too often, perhaps even for entertainment of cli-
ents." 30 This interpretation is not rational when, through daily lunches
with many different clients, the taxpayer increases his gross income by
either facilitating transactions which he may never have concluded or by
easing business frictions resulting in lower costs attributable to the trans-
action.' 3 ' Thus, the Seventh Circuit created an inconsistent position be-
cause facilitation is related to income while frequency (although it may
be a factor determining a need to facilitate) is not related to income.
More importantly, the court does not give frequency guidelines for
either expenses incurred with customers or expenses incurred by firm
personnel. The court holds that four or five times per week is too fre-
quent for business lunches even when those expenses are incurred with
customers. 132 Conversely, the court appears to allow a monthly lunch
deduction because it is incurred by a large business firm so that higher-
level employees may become acquainted with lower-level employees. 33
Unfortunately, the decision gives no guidelines on how large the firm
must be or, if the firm is smaller, whether monthly may be too frequent.
In order to increase deductibility for those expenses that are included in
the frequency "gray" areas, the other factors, facilitation and utility dis-
crepancy, should be bolstered. In large business firms, for example,
where members see very little of each other, the facilitation argument can
be used to deduct meals which are incurred to promote morale and, thus,
productivity. If the Moss criteria leave you helpless, conduct the meals
on the business premises. ' 34
POST MORTEM IMPACT OF THE MAXIMUM TAX
Van Kalker v. Commissioner 35 is one of many cases which address
130. 758 F.2d at 213. See supra note 126.
131. This position is especially bolstered when the taxpayer takes clients to an expensive or
disagreeable restaurant thereby increasing the utility discrepancy.
132. 758 F.2d at 213 (citing Hankenson, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1569) (the Seventh Circuit may in
the future hold that business meals are nondeductible when incurred daily regardless of high facilita-
tion considerations).
133. 758 F.2d at 213. The court apparently agrees with the Tax Court in Wells v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1698 (1977), aff'd without opinion, 626 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981). In Wells, the Tax Court disallowed lunch expenses paid by a head
public defender for monthly lunch meetings with his subordinates because of his status as head
public defender. The court, however, accepted the proposition that a monthly luncheon of the
thirty-three public defenders would fall within § 162(a). The Wells court relied on facilitation of co-
workers leading the members to work more productively. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1699.
134. See, e.g., McNally, supra note 122. Mr. McNally recommends an executive dining room if
meals are to be frequently furnished to firm members. The meals will then fall under I.R.C. § 119.
In addition, the Moss court did not address the question of whether the cost of Moss's meals could be
deducted as rental of the restaurant space used. 758 F.2d at 214.
135. 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5671 (1984), 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9727 (1984).
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the issue of whether capital is a material income producing factor in a
taxpayer's trade or business. 136 Although the case arose in the context of
the repealed maximum tax on personal service income,1 37 the court's
conclusion, that in certain circumstances all income derived from a busi-
ness which furnishes tangible products is personal service income, im-
pacts upon planning for family partnerships 38 and for taxpayers who
have foreign earned income. 139
I.R.C. § 1348(a) imposed a fifty percent maximum tax rate on "per-
sonal service income." Section 1348(b)(1)(A) defined the term "personal
service income" to include, in pertinent part, any income which is earned
income within the meaning of I.R.C. § 911(b). With respect to a self-
employed taxpayer engaged in a trade or business in which both personal
services and capital are material income producing factors, section
911 (b) provided that not more than thirty percent of the taxpayer's share
of the net profits of such trade or business will be considered as earned
income. Treas. Reg. § 1.1348.3(a)(3)(ii), states that capital will be a ma-
terial income producing factor if a substantial portion of the gross in-
come of the business is attributable to an investment in inventories, plant,
machinery or other equipment. Capital will not be a material income
producing factor where gross income primarily consists of "fees, commis-
sions or other compensation for personal services performed by an
individual.... "
Van Kalker custom designed, fabricated and installed wrought iron
railings. In 1978, the assets used in his business consisted principally of
real property, several trucks and automobiles, two metal cutters, four
welders, some handmade tools and a small inventory of raw iron. The
136. See, e.g., Gaudern v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1305 (1981) (bowling supply sales); Block v.
United States, 569 F. Supp. 981 (W.D. Tenn. 1983), affid, 732 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1984) (cotton
brokerage); Rubida v. Commissioner, 460 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1972) (slot machine manipulation);
Hutcheson, Jr. v. Commissioner, 540 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (construction contracting busi-
ness), Bruno v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 191 (1978) (bail bonding business).
137. I.R.C. § 1348 (1982), repealed by, Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 101(c)(l), 95 Stat. 183 (1981). There was no longer a need for a provision establishing a maximum
tax rate of 50 percent on personal or service income in light of the reduction of the maximum tax
rate from 70 percent to 50 percent by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
138. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text. Banoff, Long, Steele and Smith, Family
Partnerships Capital as a Material Income-Producing Factor, 37 TAX LAWYER 275, 278-81 (Winter,
1984) point out that neither I.R.C. § 704(e) nor the regulations thereunder explicitly incorporate by
reference analogous definitions of capital as a material income producing factor, and they set forth
the arguments for and against applying other statutory provisions. However, several courts dealing
with family partnerships have observed that the concept of capital as a material income producing
factor is found in other areas of the tax law. See Carriage Square Inc., 69 T.C. 119, 130 (1977);
Bruno, 71 T.C. at 198. Taxpayers have not been hesitant to analogize the definitions to support their
position. See, e.g., Gaudern, 77 T.C. at 1312.
139. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
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adjusted basis of these items was under thirteen percent of gross receipts.
Cost of goods sold was twenty percent of gross receipts and the cost of
labor and materials was twenty-six percent of gross receipts. Van Kalker
treated the entire amount of his 1978 net income as personal service in-
come, subject to the fifty percent maximum tax rate, on the theory that
his investment in inventory and equipment was not substantial when
measured against his personal skill and effort. Taking the position that
I.R.C. § 1348 does not admit to a comparison of the materiality of capi-
tal relative to the materiality of personal services, and that capital was
employed in the business to purchase inventory and equipment and to
meet operating requirements, the IRS limited the amount eligible for the
maximum tax to thirty percent of income.140 The Tax Court sustained
the Commissioner's position. 141
Citing a long line of cases which found capital to be a material in-
come producing factor where the taxpayer engaged in a business which
sells a finished product unaltered by the taxpayer 42 or a product altered
or applied by the taxpayer, 143 the Tax Court focused on the fact that Van
Kalker required capital to purchase, refine and sell a tangible product
which was substantially derived from raw materials.
Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Flaum rejected the Tax
Court's notion that the materiality of capital automatically correlates to
the production and/or sale of a tangible product. The test involves both
a comparison of the amount of capital to the amount of personal services
and an analysis of "whether the capital is income producing in its own
right or whether its worth depends on the application of the taxpayer's
personal skills.' 44 Recognizing that there is no definite percentage ratio
which would satisfy the first part of the test, the court found that Van
Kalker's investment of capital was not substantial.145 With respect to the
second part of the test, the court relied upon United States v. Van
Dyke 46 which held that capital is not a material income producing fac-
140. 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 5672.
141. 81 T.C. 91 (1983).
142. Moore v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 533 (1979) (retail grocery store); Wilson v. Commissioner,
43 T.C.M. (CCH) 799 (1982) (egg producing business); See Gaudern supra, note 136.
143. Gullion v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 694 (1982) (concrete flatwood business);
Rousku v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 548 (1971) (automobile body repair business). See Hutchinson
supra, note 136.
144. 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 5673-74.
145. Id. at q 5673. Although the court computed ratios measuring assets to gross receipts, gross
income and cost of sales, and compared the results to other cases in which capital was found to be a
material income producing factor, the court stated that it does not rely heavily on such comparisons
because the ratios are often the product of different factors and the comparisons do not account for
the different nature of businesses.
146. 696 F.2d 957 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
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tor where the taxpayer specially designed and handcrafted a product.
Although Van Kalker's customers purchased a product, the desirability
and price of Van Kalker's ironwork was in large measure due to his artis-
tic design, skill and effort. Thus, capital was not a material income pro-
ducing factor in his business.
In Van Kalker, the court replaces a quantitive analysis with the
more subjective approach of whether a customer would have purchased
the product but for the taxpayer's skill in designing and fashioning the
product. By expanding the test, the court muddies the waters with re-
spect to the taxation of foreign earned income and income reported by
partners who are members of family partnerships.
Subject to certain limitations, I.R.C. § 911(c) excludes foreign
earned income from taxation. Foreign earned income is defined as in-
come from sources within a foreign country which constitutes earned
income. In the case of a self-employed individual, the rules of repealed
section 911 (b) 147 have been incorporated into section 91 l(d)(2)(B). Ac-
cording to the statute, in situations in which both personal services and
capital are material income producing factors, a maximum of thirty per-
cent of such taxpayer's share of the net profits of his trade or business in
a foreign country will be considered excludable foreign earned income.148
Under the Van Kalker test, capital will not be a material income produc-
ing factor where the skills of the taxpayer are an intrinsic part of the
desirability of the product produced by his business and, in such circum-
stances, more than thirty percent of his foreign earned income derived
from such business may avoid United States taxation.
Partnerships are frequently used by family members who contribute
capital or services to conduct a trade or business. Frequently, however,
family partnerships are formed to enable a high income taxpayer to
spread his income among family members in a lower tax bracket and,
hence, create a lower overall intra-family tax liability. 149 To ensure that
the incidence of taxation of income derived for the employment of capital
in a partnership is borne by the true owner of that capital, Congress and
the Treasury have incorporated the assignment of income doctrine into
147. I.R.C. § 911(b) and (d), amended by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
34, § Ill(a), 95 Stat. 183 (1981).
148. I.R.C. § 911(d)(2)(B) (1985) provides:
In the case of a taxpayer engaged in a trade or business in which both personal services and
capital are material income-producing factors, under regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary, a reasonable allowance as compensation for the personal services rendered by the
taxpayer, not in excess of 30 percent of his share of such trade or business, shall be consid-
ered as earned income.
149. See generally McKee, Nelson, Whitmore, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS 14.01 (1977). Carriage Square, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 119 (1977).
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partnership tax law.150 Thus, a person will be safely recognized as a
partner for tax purposes only if capital is a material income producing
factor in the partnership business, and he actually owns a capital interest
in the partnership.1 5 1  Van Kalker gives the Internal Revenue Service
additional ammunition to argue that a family partnership, operating a
service or manufacturing business in which the end product or service is
salable solely on account of the skill or efforts of one partner, is indeed a
tax sham.1 52
JUDICIAL SURREALISM
In Haffner v. United States,'53 the Seventh Circuit reviewed the is-
sue of whether certain public housing authority obligations' 5 4 (Project
Notes) were subject to estate taxation. Relying on section 11(b) of the
United States Housing Act of 1937 (1937 Act),1 55 the court ruled that
the Project Notes were exempt from estate taxation.156
At the time of his death, the decedent owned Project Notes of an
aggregate par value of $1,085,000.157 The executor of the estate filed an
estate tax return listing the Project Notes on Schedule B, but stated that
the Project Notes were not subject to estate taxation on the basis of sec-
tion 11(b). 158 The Internal Revenue Service disagreed and assessed the
decedent's estate $630,808.76 in additional estate taxes., 59 The executor
paid the additional estate tax assessment and appealed the matter to the
150. Under the assignment of income doctrine, a taxpayer cannot avoid the tax on income by
assigning the right to receive the income without also transferring the property from which the right
is derived. Income will be taxed to the taxpayer who earns it or creates the right to receive it.
MERTONS, LAW OF FED INCOME TAX § 18.02 (1982).
151. I.R.C. § 704(e) provides:
A person shall be recognized as a partner for purposes of this subtitle if he owns a capital
interest in a partnership in which capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or
not such interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other person.
152. In Nichols v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1322 (1959), the court recognized the validity of a
partnership between a radiologist and his wife, who was responsible for office services. Of course,
partnership revenues were a direct function of the reputation and skill of only one partner.
153. 757 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1985).
154. The following public housing agency notes were the subject matter for this litigation:
(a) $85,000 par value Anne Arundel Co., Md., dated 4/11/78, 3.79% project notes
due 4/13/79.
(b) $1,000,000 par Oklahoma City, Okla., dated 5/9/78, 4.12% project notes due 5/
11/79.
155. 757 F.2d at 920.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1437i(b) (1982). Section 1 l(b) provides in pertinent part:
Obligations, including interest thereon, issued by public housing agencies in connection
with low-income housing projects shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereinafter
imposed by the United States whether paid by such agencies or by the Secretary.
157. Haffner, 585 F. Supp. 354, 355 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 356.
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District Director of Internal Revenue. The District Director denied the
appeal and the executor brought an action for refund of the additional
estate tax assessment in the district court. The district court, ruling on
the estate's motion for summary judgment, held that the Project Notes
were not includable in the decedent's estate' 6° and thus, not subject to
estate taxation under I.R.C. § 2033.161 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision, adopting the district court's opinion with only
minor modifications. 162
The Seventh Circuit's decision involved the construction of the lan-
guage of section 1 1(b) of the 1937 Act. This provision states that
"[O]bligations, including interest thereon, issued by public housing agen-
cies ... shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by
the United States whether paid by such agencies or by the United
States." The court noted that the estate tax is not a direct tax on prop-
erty, but an excise tax imposed on the passage of the value of such prop-
erty from a decedent to his legatees.163 It is well established in case law
that an exemption of securities or bonds from "taxation" does not extend
to an exemption from estate or inheritance taxes.164 The court empha-
sized that such precedent should not be ignored except where Congres-
sional intent to do so is "clear and unambiguous."1 65
The court applied two rules of statutory construction to find that
Congress intended to override prior case law addressing the issue of the
exemption of property transfers from estate taxation.166 The first rule
provides that language of a statute should be construed giving operative
160. Id. at 361.
161. I.R.C. § 2033 provides: "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death."
162. 757 F.2d at 920.
163. 585 F. Supp. at 356; See, e.g., Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115, 130 (1900) (superceded by
statute; see American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 436 U.S. 855 (1983)); Greiner v. Lewel-
lyn, 258 U.S. 384, 387 (1922); United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194, 198 (1960).
164. See, e.g., Murdock v. Ward, 178 U.S. 139, 145-47, 20 S. Ct. 775, 777-78, 44 L. Ed. 1009
(1900); United States Trust Co. v. Helvering, 307 U.S. 57, 60 (1939); Inglehart v. Commissioner, 77
F.2d 704, 712 (5th Cir. 1935); Greene v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 459 (1959). See also Treas.
Reg. § 20.2033-1 (1963) which provides in pertinent part:
Various statutory provisions which exempt bonds, notes, bills, and certificates of indebted-
ness of the Federal Government or its agencies and the interest thereon from taxation are
generally not applicable to the estate tax, since such tax is an excise tax on the transfer of
property at death and is not a tax on the property transferred.
The general rule is also reflected in two cases which address the gift taxability of certain United
States Treasury bills. See Hammersley v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 768 (Ct. Cl. 1936), cert. denied,
300 U.S. 659 (1937); Phipps v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 627 (10th Cir.), cert. denied., 302 U.S. 742
(1937).
165. 585 F. Supp. 355, 358 (1984).
166. Id. at 361.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
effect to every clause.1 67 The second rule provides that sections of a sin-
gle statute should be presumed to have been drafted with reference to one
another; the whole statute is the context for construction of any of its
individual sections. 168
In the process of applying the rules of statutory construction, the
Seventh Circuit examined two other sections of the 1937 Act. 169 Both of
these sections addressed the tax treatment of obligations of public hous-
ing authorities. The language of section 5(e) was identical to that of sec-
tion l(b) in its reference to an exemption "from all taxation. 1' 70
However, section 20(b) of the 1937 Act specifically limited the exemption
from taxation by a parenthetical reference to all taxation other than sur-
taxes, estate, inheritance and gift taxes.' 7' The court also reviewed the
legislative history of the 1937 Act, particularly certain statements made
by a sponsor of the bill. ' 72 The sponsor specifically commented that the
obligations of public housing agencies, issued pursuant to the 1937 Act,
"are free from income tax, surtax, estate, gift and inheritance taxes."'1 73
The court determined that these factors provided a sufficient basis for
holding that the stated exemption from "all taxation" encompassed es-
tate taxes.
174
The Seventh Circuit's technical approach to the resolution of the
issue in this case was correct. However, the subject case was not an ap-
propriate setting in which to place such heavy reliance on statutory rules
of construction to override existing case law. The substantive law limit-
ing the interpretation and effect of the phrase "exempt from all taxation"
was well-established. 175 Neither of the parties to this action disputed this
167. Id. at 358. See, e.g., Adler v. Northern Hotel Co., 175 F.2d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 1949) (citing
Market Co. v. Hoffman 101, U.S. 112, 115-116 (1879)); American Bank and Trust Co. v. Dallas
County, 463 U.S. 855 (1983).
168. 585 F. Supp. at 358. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534,
542-44 (1940).
169. United States Housing Act of 1937, §§ 5(c), 20(b), amended by, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1405(c),
1420(b) (1946).
170. Section 5(c) of the 1937 Act reads as follows:
Obligations, including interest thereon issued by public housing agencies in connection
with low-rent housing or slum clearance projects, and the income derived from such
projects, shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States.
171. Section 20(b) of the 1937 Act reads as follows: "Such obligations, shall be exempt, both as
to principal and interest, from all taxation (except surtaxes, estate, inheritance, and gift taxes) now
or hereafter imposed by the United States or by any state, county, municipality, or local taxing
authority."
172. See 81 CONG. REC. 8086-88 (1937).
173. 81 CONG. REC. 8085 (1937).
174. 585 F. Supp. at 361. See Greene v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 459, cert. denied, 360 U.S.
933 (1959); Jandorf's Estate v. Commissioner, 171 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1948).
175. Supra note 164.
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fact. 176 Further, in view of then existing case law, it was not necessary
for the draftsmen of the 1937 Act to include a parenthetical exclusion
limiting the exemption "from all taxation" in each of the provisions since
the application of such case law would produce consistent tax treatment
by making testamentary transfers of the referenced debt instruments sub-
ject to estate taxation. The intention of Congress to exempt the Project
Notes from estate taxation was not so "clear and unambiguous," as the
Seventh Circuit suggests, as to justify the court's deviation from the case
law addressing the issue.
Congress prospectively limited the impact of the court's decision by
enacting section 641 of the Tax Reform Act of 1984.177 Section 641(a)
provides that statutes exempting property from taxation shall not be in-
terpreted as exempting such property from estate, gift and generation-
skipping taxes unless it refers to the specific provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. Situations in which the executor or donor filed an estate
or gift tax return reporting the transfer as subject to federal estate or gift
tax, section 641(b)(2) of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 makes section
641(a) applicable to such transfers even if the transfers were made prior
to the act's effective date of June 19, 1984. This provision operates to
prevent claims for refunds where an estate or gift tax return was previ-
ously filed which reported the transfer as subject to Federal estate or gift
tax.
INCOME FORECAST METHOD OF DEPRECIATION
In Gordon v. Commissioner,17 8 the court faced the issue of whether,
for purposes of the income forecast method of depreciation for a motion
picture film, a cash basis taxpayer's 79 income from a film during a tax
year includes revenues received by the distributor but not subsequently
remitted by the distributor to the taxpayer.
Because motion picture and television films produce an uneven
stream of income due to contract restrictions, methods of distribution
and program popularity, the Commissioner recognized in Revenue Rul-
ing 60-358,18o as modified by Revenue Ruling 64-273,181 that the useful-
ness of a film for depreciation purposes may more accurately be
176. 585 F. Supp. at 356-57.
177. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
178. 766 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1985).
179. Pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1960), a cash basis taxpayer reports income in the
year in which such income is actually or constructively received by the taxpayer.
180. 1960-2 C.B. 68.
181. 1964-2 C.B. 62.
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measured by the flow of its income rather than the passage of time. Ac-
cordingly, the Commissioner authorized the use of the income forecast
method of depreciation by which depreciation would be computed on the
basis of a fraction, the numerator of which is the income from the film
for the taxable year, and the denominator of which is the estimated total
income from the film during its useful life. For purposes of the fraction,
income means income from the film less the cost of distributing the film,
not including depreciation. 182
Revenue Ruling 78-28113 addressed the question whether, under the
income forecast method, a cash basis taxpayer could include, as income
in the numerator of the fraction, payments which the taxpayer had
earned under a distribution contract but had not received by the end of
the tax year. The Commissioner ruled that, since the purpose of the in-
come forecast method is to prevent income distortion by matching depre-
ciation deductions with income derived from assets generating the
income, the numerator of the fraction used to compute the depreciation
deduction for the tax year must reflect the same gross income used to
compute taxable income from the film for the same period.
Mitchell Film Company was a limited partnership which owned the
motion picture "Mitchell." The partners entered into an agreement with
Allied Artists under which Allied distributed "Mitchell." However, no
portion of the revenues from distribution for the tax year were ever re-
mitted to the partnership. 184 Nonetheless, using the income forecast
method of depreciation on its tax return, the partnership claimed depre-
ciation by including the receipts reported by Allied in the numerator of
the fraction.
The Seventh Circuit interpreted the term "income," for purposes of
computation of depreciation by the income forecast method, to mean the
income properly reportable by the taxpayer as income under its method
of accounting.18 5 Since the taxpayer received no taxable income from the
film distributor for the tax year, the taxpayer was not entitled to claim a
deduction for depreciation under the income forecast method. 186
The Gordon case underscores one of the principle objectives of in-
come tax accounting, which is to match the income with the expenses
incurred in the production of such income.18 7 In order to achieve the
182. Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. at 68-69.
183. 1978-1 C.B. 61.
184. 766 F.2d at 298.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Seigel v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 659, 693 (1982).
TAXATION SUBSTANCE v. FORM...
matching of income with expenses in the film industry, the income fore-
cast method necessarily requires that the term "income" includes only
income actually or constructively received by the taxpayer as provided
by I.R.C. § 451(a) and Treas. Reg. § 1.451.1(a). The taxpayer's attempt
to apply the income forecast method using the gross revenues received by
the distributor but not paid to the taxpayer fails to achieve this objective
since it generates depreciation deductions in the absence of correspond-
ing taxable income. The Seventh Circuit's reliance on Revenue Ruling
78-28188 and applicable case law 189 in deciding the Gordon case was cor-
rect and consistent with fundamental principles of income tax
accounting.
COSTING OF PLAYER CONTRACTS IN SPORTS FRANCHISES
In Selig v. United States,190 the Seventh Circuit held that the alloca-
tion of $10.2 million of a $10.8 million baseball franchise purchase price
to the value of players' contracts was not clearly erroneous. In this re-
gard, the court determined that the "club" market, in which players'
contracts were valued in relation to the team's purchase price, was the
most reasonable basis for appraisal of the players' contracts because the
"club" market is a free market creating arms-length allocations.' 9'
On April 1, 1970, Allan "Bud" Selig purchased the Seattle Pilots
baseball team for $10.8 million, moved the team to Milwaukee, and
renamed it the Brewers. 192 Using four appraisals of the Seattle team,
Selig allocated $10.2 million to the players' contracts-slightly higher
than the average of the four appraisals. He allocated $500,000 to the
value of the franchise. 193 Because the players' contracts were depreciable
under I.R.C. § 167(a)194 and the franchise costs were not depreciable, the
Internal Revenue Service challenged the allocation, valued the contracts
at zero, and valued the franchise at $10.7 million. The taxpayer sued for
and obtained a refund in U.S. District Court. 95 The government ap-
188. 1978-1 C.B. 61.
189. Greene v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 132 (1983); Siegel v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 659 (1982);
Fife v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 1 (1984); Wildman v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 943 (1982).
190. 740 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1984).
191. Id. at 578.
192. Id. at 575.
193. Id. The appraisals averaged $1,043,000. Selig also allocated $100,000 to equipment and
supplies.
194. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1985) provides: (a) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a deprecia-
tion deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable
allowance for obsolescence)-(1) of property used in the trade or business, or (2) of property held for
the production of income .... "
195. Selig v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 524 (1983), aftd, 740 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1984).
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pealed this adverse ruling.
On appeal, the Selig court reviewed the three possible bases of valua-
tions: the "player" market, the "free agent" market, and the "club"
market. 196 The "player" market was the most common market in which
teams negotiated to buy players' contracts. Here, however, baseball's
waiver and reserve rules created price fixing not conducive to arms-
length transactions. 197 In the "free agent" market,198 players with no
previous major or minor league contracts negotiated for their first con-
tracts. Thus, this market did not include the veteran players' values
which are transferred in a team sale. The "club" market included play-
ers' values in the purchase price of an entire team. These valuations in-
volved negotiations between the buyer and seller free of baseball's
regulations. 199 The court concluded that the "club" market was appro-
priate because Selig's purchase actually occurred in that market and the
assigned contract values would be based on arms-length negotiations. 200
Finally, the court noted that because Selig obtained the appraisals in
the appropriate market and because his valuation approximated the ap-
praisals, the valuation was reasonable. As additional support the court
analogized Laird v. United States.201 In Laird, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the allocation of eighty-eight percent of the purchase price of the Atlanta
Falcons to football players' contracts. 20 2 Thus, the ninety-five percent
allocation by Selig appeared proper.
With the participation of veteran players in the "free agent" mar-
ket 20 3 and with the limitation of players' contract values set forth in
I.R.C. § 1056, this decision appears to have little current impact. Section
1056 limits the valuation of players' contracts when purchasing a sports
196. 740 F.2d at 575-76. This review was undertaken after Judge Bauer delightfully elaborated
on baseball-the game and its history. The decision is enjoyable reading for any baseball fan. Id. at
572-74.
197. 740 F.2d at 575.
198. Veteran players had no right to declare "free agency" and compete for cash in the re-entry
draft until 1976. 740 F.2d at 575-76. Thus, the "club" market conclusion (see supra note 191) is of
little impact today. For the impact of Selig regarding I.R.C. § 1056 (1985) see infra notes 204-06
and accompanying text.
199. 740 F.2d at 576.
200. Id. at 578.
201. 566 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
202. Id. at 1237-42. In Laird, the purchase price of the team was first discounted by the present
value of the television rights purchased. Thus, the players' contracts were valued at $3.03 million of
the $3.5 million left after subtracting $4.3 million of T.V. rights. Id. at 1230. The discount of T.V.
rights is proper with respect to baseball because the purchase price of a baseball team does not
include such rights. 740 F.2d at 580. Cf. First Northwest Indus. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 817
(1978), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 649 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1981) (91% allocation to
contracts were improper when the franchise bought was a basketball expansion team and the T.V.
rights were not discounted in the allocation).
203. See supra note 198.
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franchise to the transferor's adjusted basis of such contracts plus the
gain, if any, recognized by the transferor on the transfer of such con-
tracts. The contracts are presumed to be worth no more than one half of
the franchise purchase price.204 The Seventh Circuit implied that this
presumption was rebutted by Selig.20 5 The implication that "club" mar-
ket appraisals were sufficient to rebut the presumption indicates a possi-
ble leniency by the circuit in applying the limitation, although, arguably,
this leniency was unintended by Congress.20 6 Last, because professional
sports teams are organized into leagues, a uniform market exists where
players' contracts can be valued against one another. Other service busi-
nesses do not have such uniformity. This decision, therefore, is limited to
the valuation of players' contracts for sports franchises only, and does
not extend to non-sports service contracts.
204. I.R.C. § 1056 (1985) provides in part as follows:
(a) General Rule.-If a franchise to conduct any sports enterprise is sold or ex-
changed, and if, in connection with such sale or exchange, there is a transfer of a contract
for the services of an athlete, the basis of such contract in the hands of the transferee shall
not exceed the sum of-(l) the adjusted basis of such contract in the hands of the trans-
feror immediately before the transfer, plus (2) the gain (if any) recognized by the transferor
on the transfer of such contract .... (d) Presumption as to amount allocatable to player
contracts.-In the case of any sale or exchange described in subsection (a), it shall be pre-
sumed that not more than 50 percent of the consideration is allocable to contracts for the
services of athletes .... "
Id. at subsections (a) and (d).
205. 740 F.2d at 759 n.17:
The government argues that section [1056] nevertheless indicates the impropriety of a 95-
percent allocation. The section does allow, however, for proof by a taxpayer that a specific
amount exceeding 50 percent should be allowed. Congress clearly wanted to limit the tax
benefits accorded to the sale of a club. But Congress's opinion on whether taxpayers in the
past had allocated unreasonable amounts to player contracts does not weigh against the
plaintiff here.
740 F.2d at 579 n.17.
206. Congress appears to be disenchanted with depreciating a large portion of the franchise price
because a franchise tax shelter with negative tax income and positive cash flow results. See H.R.
REP. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116-17.

